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Excellent!!!

His views on "projection error" are quite important and should be discussed in ethics today, and should not be ignored. He establishes a difference between moral absolutism and ethnocentrism, and proves that relativists have no basis for their position.

Certainly, this is one of the greatest contributions I've ever seen in the field of Ethics.

Important Questions, No Answers -- which is how it has to be

Misleading title

However I found that the real subject is the Relativistic approach versus the Ethnocentric one: which is mainly, from my point of view, a discussion between two philosophical parties without supporting the real matter.

Important arguments but annoying rhetoric

Cook's initial chapters explore, in good philosophical fashion, what it is we are really asserting when we assert moral relativism. Those who attack relativism usually miss their target because they misunderstand its fundamental assertion. This assertion Cook identifies as the anthropological observation that we learn morality through the process of "enculturative conditioning," that is to say, children learn morality not by an impartial search for truth but by taking on the rules and judgements of their elders. Since the process of becoming moral is not truth-oriented but culture-oriented, relativists point out, moral judgements are only correct within particular cultures, not universally.

Cook then subjects the view of moral relativism to searching criticism and exposes many of the strange paradoxes which result from it. He looks at the history of anthropology and shows that pioneers like Franz Boas did not espouse relativism, although his disciples thought he did. He demonstrates how Boas was actually concerned with the projection of (our) motives onto the actions of people in other cultures, not with relativizing the morality of other peoples' motives.

His concludes that the deadlock between moral relativists and moral absolutists comes from them both sharing a distorted view of what morality really is. Both start with the idea that morality is concerned primarily with classing actions as right or wrong according to abstract principles determined by an outside authority. Instead he follows Arthur Murphy and Iris Murdoch in espousing a view of morality that is more concerned with character and how kindly we respond to others than with how accurately we follow abstract principles. Indeed as he sees it, a moral sense properly speaking, often develops in a struggle against the "enculturative conditioning" described above. Thus moral relativism is not so much wrong as incoherent. If rules aren't the center of morality, then the cultural relativity of rules is no argument for a relativity of morals.

As the book goes on, Cook makes it increasingly clear that for him moral growth is pretty much the same thing as becoming a secular liberal. The description of his ideal moral community of "Islandia" gives an unintentionally hilarious portrait of liberal self-infatuation. The smugness can get irritating, and uncharitable readers could be forgiven for taking Cook's argument to be "Of course morality isn't relative-it's just obvious that we creative, sensitive liberals are better people than those complacent Republican yahoos in flyover country." But contrary to what they think, liberals have no monopoly on moral growth.

In the end, I believe that Cook's central idea is right. Following or not following rules is only part, and not the most important part, of morality. Rules serve character and human feeling, not the other way around. If that is so, the diversity of customs and mores is no argument for a diversity of moralities. Read the book, listen closely to the arguments, and laugh off the smug liberal platitudes.

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