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Title: Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy)
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| Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) by Routledge Excellent But Not Elementary | General metaphysics is a difficult and central area of philosophy. While there is a lot of literature devoted to it, I do not think that there are very many introductory texts. Michael Loux's "Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction" fills a gap.
This book is devoted exclusively to general metaphysics; there is no discussion of the subjects of special metaphysics, such as the existence of God, the nature of mind, and free will. The subjects covered are the nature of universals, substance, propositions, modality, persistence through time, and the Realism/Anti-Realism debate.
Loux explains the different theories about these subjects and evaluates arguments for and against these theories. The focus is on the contemporary literature; however, some historical background is provided. While the coverage is comprehensive, depth is not sacrificed.
The chapters are well-organised, each beginning with a brief chapter overview and concluding with suggestions for further reading. Loux style is clear and friendly.
While introductory, this book is not elementary. It is intended for students who have already attended an introductory philosophy course. Those without any previous exposure to contemporary analytic philosophy may find it very difficult.
I recommend this book strongly for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy. Readers may also be interested in Loux's anthology, "Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings". | | Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) by Routledge Murky, Muddled and Marginalized | Murky:
In his book, 1984, Orwell described a contrived language he called "newspeak", designed to render politically incorrect ideas inexpressible. But before Orwell there were Russell and Whitehead, who contrived a symbolic logic that distorts ideas they deemed philosophically incorrect by combining logical quantification with expression of existence. As Whitehead wrote in his "Foreword" to Quine's Ph.D. dissertation titled A System of Logic: logic shapes metaphysical thought.
Thus in his "On Universals" Quine argued that in the Russellian logic realism must be expressed by quantifying over predicates so they reference universals as "entities". And he co-authored with Goodman "Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism", a nominalist manifesto, in which all philosophers are classified as either nominalists or "platonists" depending on whether or not predicates are quantified so they reference entities. I believe that anyone who says that universals are "referenced" or who uses the phrase "abstract entities" fully deserves to be labeled a Platonist.
But Loux uses the rhetoric from the Russellian nominalist newspeak. In the "search inside this book" screens at this Amazon web site the reader will find him reporting (p. 20) that realists say universals are shared "entities" and are "referents" of predicates.
I ask Loux: What happened to signification? The symbolic logician Alonzo Church recognized sense (i.e. signification) as well as denotation (i.e. reference) in the functional (i.e. predicate) calculus. I ask Loux: What happened to supposition, which distinguishes reference from signification? In his book titled Meaning and Necessity Rudolf Carnap explicitly affirms that intensions (i.e. significations) may be said to be objective without invoking any hypostatization (i.e. reference), and are indifferent to either concrete or abstract objects. I ask Loux: Since the demise of logical positivism does the Russellian predicate calculus have any applications in philosophy or anywhere else? Is Loux trying to appear contemporary with the Russellian rhetoric? I see murky writing.
Muddled:
Loux is sympathetic to Aristotle and unsympathetic to Quine, the pragmatic realist, who rejects first philosophies with their prejudicial ontological criteria for scientific criticism, and who affirms ontological relativity in which ontological commitment is subordinated to empirical testing.
Ontological relativity started as an analogy: Quine relativized ontology as Einstein relativized time. Einstein posited relativistic time as real time instead of Newton's absolute time, and he rejected Lorentz's making relativistic time apparent time. Likewise Heisenberg invoked this Einstein precedent for his own realistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory's positing of duality and indeterminacy. Today physicists describe reality in terms of superposition, nonlocality and Calabi-Yau spaces in eleven dimensions. Quine generalized beyond physics to our global web of beliefs.
Realism is a natural, primordial, irrepressible prejudice motivated by disappointments in our beliefs including falsifications of our scientific theories. On the other hand ontology is anything but natural or primordial. It is an elaborately complex linguistic artifact that evolves and that has a cultural history. It is reality as cognitively captured by the artifactual semantics of language expressing our accepted general beliefs including our tested and currently nonfalsified scientific theories.
But in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic and in this book Loux rejects ontological relativity, and he calls philosophies using ontological relativity "anti-Realism". In fact ontological relativity and relativized semantics do not oppose realism, but rather they enable it in this age of scientific change. I do not find this book contemporary. Loux's "Realism - anti-Realism" locution is a false dichotomy. I see muddled thinking.
Marginalized:
While a student I found Notre Dame's philosophy faculty unsympathetic to contemporary pragmatism and its scientific realism. When I left their graduate school of philosophy I took with me the opinion that their academic culture is a marginalized backwater preferring to protect the past rather than forge the future with new thinking. I see in this book a textbook in Notre Dame metaphysics for Notre Dame philosophy students.
Readers who are cognizant of the influence of modern science on philosophy - notably how quantum theory occasioned the emergence and ascendancy of contemporary pragmatism - are likely to be more critical of this book than other reviewers at this Amazon site.
Thomas J. Hickey | | Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) by Routledge What Loux does, he does well | "Metaphysics" has meant many things to many different people. Loux helpfully distinguishes in the introduction between general and special metaphysics. The former concerns being qua being, and the latter concerns disparate topics such as free will, cosmology, and God. Loux said he would only concern himself with general metaphysics. Specifically, he concerns himself with Anglophone general metaphysics from 1950 to 1990. Thus, the subtitle, "A Contemporary Introduction."
Loux treats universals (realism vs. nominalism), concrete particulars (substrata vs. bundles, persistence through time), propositions, and modality (necessity and possibility). He handles matters will a degree of explicitness, thoroughness, and evenhandedness. The text is challenging at points--I attribute this to the fact that metaphysics cannot be dumbed down.
All in all, quite thorough and an excellent introduction to contemporary general metaphysics. | | Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) by Routledge A gateway to current metaphysics... | Anyone interested in the issues that make up current debates in metaphysics should read this book. It opens up an entirely new vocabularly and conceptual scheme for those with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. Working through the chapters, arguments, and positions will greatly facilitate comprehension of more technical philosophical papers. At the same time the book presents the material in a technical fashion; it reads like real philosophy, as it should. Arguments receive in depth treatment and important sides to issues get presented fairly. For a beginner, this book will present many challenges. But overcoming these will reap great rewards. Probably the best thing to do after completing the book is to read it again. Of course this principle holds true for a lot of philosophy books, but since this one builds a foundation a second deep reading becomes almost essential.
Seven chapters cover some of the biggest issues in metaphysics. Each chapter builds on its predecessors, so the book doesn't hold up well to random browsing. It should be comprehended linearly. Starting off, the nearly ancient debate between nominalists and realists (with a small 'r') fills two chapters. Arguments for and against both positions take up most of the space (e.g., abstract entities, predication, Ockham's Razor, etc., along with a delineation of the various types of nominalism - austere, metalinguistic, trope theory). Chapter three discusses the arguments relating to the nature of concrete particulars, or the 'substratum' versus the 'bundle' theory. The nature of propositions gets a fair shake in chapter four; are they abstract necessarily existing entities or just talk about regular old concrete objects? Next, David Lewis' eyebrow-raising view of possible worlds and modality is coherently outlined in chapter five. Here the discussion get really juicy and complex. Modality is no picnic. Do possible worlds actually exist in the same manner of our own world or are possible worlds merely potential actual worlds that never obtained the level of an 'actual world'? Chapter six revisits the concrete particulars examined in chapter three, but now with the element of time included. Two views, endurantism and perdurantism, are juxtaposed along with two theories of time, presentism and eternalism. Finally, chapter seven gets to the bottom of many of the book's debates, which can be, cursorily, ground down to the question of human beings' connections between language and the world. Do languages actually refer to a mind-independent world or is the world we talk about inextricably linked to our sensory and conceptual processes? These questions explode in the debate between Realists (this time with a capital 'R') and anti-Realists. Anti-Realists challenge the 'traditional' notion of a direct connection between language and a mind-independent world. The idea of the 'inscrutablility of reference' (from W.V.O. Quine, though with a specific interpretation by the author and Hilary Putnam) provides meat for the anti-Realist's argument. This final chapter sees Realists and anti-Realists duking it out over these issues. The chapter, and the entire book, provide plenty of food for the brain to chew on.
Throughout the book, the author argues for an Aristotelian-flavored "being 'qua' being" approach to metaphysics. This is very apparent in the book's excellent introduction as well as in the final chapter (aptly titled "The challenge of anti-Realism"). Though he makes his preference explicit, the arguments against his position still get a very fair shake. The author's position in no way degrades the quality of for-and-against delineation of arguments. So, even if readers do not agree with the author's overall stance, they can still obtain much useful knowledge.
Though the book's subtitle reads "a contemporary introduction" it is not an easy read. Major universities have used it for courses (the University of Minnesota's Philosophy department used it in a 5-XXX level class). Still, the book is not inaccessible to any careful general reader. It just takes some work. And that work, especially to someone seeking an entryway into the foundations of current metaphysical debates, will pay off in droves. | | Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) by Routledge Clearly and Precisely Written | | Metaphysics is an extremely abstract topic in philosophy, yet one cannot fully do philosophy without a basic understanding of metaphysics. Loux's book is the introduction to metaphysics that anyone can pick up and begin to understand what the arguments are in metaphysics. After reading this introductory book, one should have the knowledge to begin to delve into other areas of philosophy - or to seek a deeper understanding of metaphysics in other areas. I can't think of a better beginning point for learning about the basic arguments and positions in metaphysics than this book. Though every introduction is limited by space and will cover different topics, Loux's book is one of the most comprehensive introductions to metaphysics that I've seen. | | Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy) by Routledge Product Description | Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction is for students who have already done an introductory philosophy course. Michael J. Loux provides a fresh look at the central topics in metaphysics, making this essential reading for any student of the subject. This third edition is revised and updated and includes two new chapters on Time and Causation.
Topics addressed include:
· the problem of universals
· the nature of abstract entities
· the problem of individuation
· the nature of modality
· identity through time
· the nature of time
· the Realism/anti-Realism debate
Wherever possible, Michael J. Loux relates contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. As an experienced teacher of philosophy and an important contributor to recent debates, Loux is uniquely qualified to write this book.
· the third edition retains the student -friendly features of previous editions:
· chapter overviews summarizing the main topics of study
· examples to clarify difficult concepts annotated further reading at the end of each chapter
· endnotes and a full bibliography |
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