| This book is the result of a symposium held 13-15 May 1997 exploring the question, if science can explain life by first principles. A series of seventeen chapters each presenting a thesis followed by a panel discussion covers a broad spectrum of biology. For biologists, reductionism means that a particular characteristics of a living organism can be explained in terms of chemistry and physics. This would, in other words, eliminate the need for biology as a science. No wonder the question is important to biologists. The problem with biology, unlike physics, is that its objects of interest are extremely complex. The simpler a system, and this does not refer to size, the easier it is to understand it based on first principles, i.e., that reductionism works and the whole is simply the sum of its parts. Exploring the limits of reductionism in biology is important, because there is ample evidence that many fields of biological studies are non-reductionist in nature. It appears to be the goal of the book to show that much of biology cannot be reduced to physico-chemical properties. Take consciousness as an example. Consciousness is the function of a very complex organ and not reducible to an atomistic description. Which does not mean that there aren't any people who believe that with enough work and insight, a reductionist explanation of the mind might one day be achieved, but that there are simply too many parameters still undiscovered for such an approach to work today. According to the scientists presenting and discussing their work, the limits of reductionism in biology lie somewhere between biochemistry and physiology, with biochemistry being the most reductionist branch of biology (the body is a chemical factory). The series of chapters are organized accordingly. After a general epistemological presentation of the problem by the philosopher Thomas Nagel, scientists present aspects of biological studies that are clearly reductionist in character. These include the study of structure and function of macromolecules and the analysis of bacterial metabolism as an example of biological computation. The majority of contributions, however, come from studies resisting any reductionist explanation. This is true for the physiology of the human heart, the brain (memory, hearing), animal behavior, ecological systems, and mechanism of natural selection. Evidently, any theory of the chemical bond can tell us nothing about behavior, but certainly about the structure of a protein. The limits of reductionism in biology are intuitive. They are found right there where a Descartian philosophy would compare an organism to a machine (reductionist), while a holistic view sees higher level properties as 'emerging' from complex systems (anti-reductionist). I believe this is an important book, but because it is the result of a scientific conference, presentations and discussions include terms like phototaxis, steady-state, subsynaptic cytoplasm, imprinting, equilibrium thermodynamics, gap junctions, long-term potentiation, sarcoplasmic reticulum, all of which have specific meanings unfamiliar to the general reader. The readers benefiting best are scientists interested in the philosophical aspect of their work. Add a glossary explaining scientific terms and this book could be made into an interesting and easier to read book for a readership beyond the scientific community. |
| The reductionist programme in biology has yielded amazing insights into the basic processes of life. In particular, the explanation of many cellular processes at the molecular level has revolutionized our understanding of biology. However, given the vast increase in the amount of analytical information now being obtained, we have to ask how much we really need to know in order to 'understand' a biological process. The reductionist programme raises fundamental questions about levels of explanation. This book brings together a celebrated group of philosophers and scientists to discuss these problems. Some chapters deal with the enormously powerful techniques of molecular biology, and analyse precisely how molecular information has improved our understanding of biological processes. Others deal with specific physiological systems in relation to the appropriateness of attempts to provide reductionist explanations. The area of brain and behaviour is given particularly close attention because there are a number of differing views held by scientists about whether an analytical and reductionist approach is even desirable in this context. Separate chapters deal with ecological and evolutionary issues. Providing a comprehensive account of the application of reductionist ideas in biology, this book deals with controversial ideas, particularly in relation to reductionist explanations of behaviour, and presents both sides of the argument. The issues raised are relevant to virtually every area of biological research. |
