|
Title: Wittgenstein's Metaphysics
Purchase
Item
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
List Price: $140.00
Our Price: $139.84
|
|
| Customer Reviews: |
| Wittgenstein's Metaphysics by Cambridge University Press Truly miserable | | This is one of the worst books ever written about any major philosopher. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that if Wittgenstein writes, say, "For heaven's sake, don't think for a moment that I believe that X," Cook's "quotation" will abridge this to the form "I believe that X." (For substantiation of this claim, I too refer interested readers to the journal article by Philip Dwyer which the first person to review the book referred to.) - I accept Professor Powell's comment in his review that in philosophy, it is possible to be wrong in an important and illuminating way, but Cook is regrettably wrong in an entirely unilluminating way. That a book this shoddy, this disingenuous, managed to be published by a respected university press, is simply a scandal of scholarship. | | Wittgenstein's Metaphysics by Cambridge University Press Formidable, clear attack from one of Wittgenstein's students | | It is certainly a live issue whether Cook has Wittgenstein right, that he remained an empiricist (Hintikka has a similar take), and another whether it matters if Wittgenstein did not believe or practice most of what many of us thought we learned from him. Anyone interested in addressing both issues will find Cook's two books (this one and _Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language_) central to that effort. If Cook is wrong (as Russell remarked about W.) it's still important. The reviews have been negative, but it is disingenuous to dismiss Cook's arguments as shoddy, and some of the reviewers (not just on Amazon) have clearly not read the books. Exposition of W. is notoriously difficult, and Cook offers reams of evidence, not all of which is out of context or misunderstood. | | Wittgenstein's Metaphysics by Cambridge University Press Unabashed, boldly provocative. And a real stinker. | In this book, John W. Cook, who used to be one of the chief proponents of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a champion of neutral monism. Neutral monism is a phenomenalistic doctrine that holds, among other things, that the only immediate objects of experience are mental entities called sense-data. The early Wittgenstein, not the later, is generally interpreted as being a phenomenalistic neutral monist, but Cook contends that Wittgenstein's espousal of this doctrine did not alter throughout his philosophical career. Bertrand Russell once said, and I'm paraphrasing, "If a hundred brilliant men think something is true, they aren't necessarily wrong." A hundred Wittgenstein scholars aren't wrong, are they?
No, they aren't! Cook's thesis is based on a systematic misinterpretation of Wittgenstein's later writings. Indeed, the entire book is an exercise in shoddy scholarship and breathtaking effrontery. On literally hundreds of occasions, Cook conveniently neglects discussing relevant passages from Wittgenstein's later writings. In addition, he often employs the three-dot ellipsis within relevant passages in order to buttress his bizarre interpretation. Space constraints preclude me from giving any kind of responsible exegesis here, so I'll direct you to an article that demonstrates, with careful and persuasive precision, why Cook's interpretation shouldn't be taken seriously. See Phil Dwyer's "Cooking the Books: John W. Cook on Wittgenstein's Purported Metaphysics," Journal of Philosophical Research, VVIV (1999) 311-343. | | Wittgenstein's Metaphysics by Cambridge University Press Product Description | | Wittgenstein's Metaphysics offers a radical new interpretation of the fundamental ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It takes issue with the conventional view that after 1930 Wittgenstein rejected the philosophy of the Tractatus and developed a wholly new conception of philosophy. By tracing the evolution of Wittgenstein's ideas, Cook shows that they are neither as original nor as difficult as is often supposed. Wittgenstein was essentially an empiricist, and the difference between his early views (as set forth in the Tractatus) and the later views (as expounded in the Philosophical Investigations) lies chiefly in the fact that after 1930 he replaced his early version of reductionism with a subtler version. So he ended where he began, as an empiricist armed with a theory of meaning. This iconoclastic interpretation is sure to influence all future study of Wittgenstein and will provoke a reassessment of the nature of his contribution to philosophy. |
No item elements found in rss feed.
|
