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Title: On the Plurality of Worlds
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| On the Plurality of Worlds by Wiley-Blackwell The Case for Modal Realism. | In the book _On the Plurality of Worlds_, analytic philosopher David Lewis presents his case for modal realism (also called "extreme modal realism", though why it is "extreme" is questioned). As Lewis explains, "This book defends modal realism: the thesis that the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds." Lewis will argue for this position based on the fact of the utility of modal realism for philosophy provides reason to believe that it is true (just as the utility of set theory provides reason to believe that there are sets), then he will consider the common objections to this position and argue against them. Lewis maintains that he does not provide an argument that effectively requires one to believe in a plurality of worlds, but only that he will provide a cost-benefits analysis of this idea. The idea of possible worlds is a recurrent one in the philosophy of Leibniz; however, Lewis does not mention him because he feels that any interpretation he might offer of Leibniz's works would be inadequate. David Lewis (1941-2001) who taught at Princeton was one of the more interesting thinkers in analytic philosophy and this book is certain to remain a classic and can be appreciated even if one cannot go all the way with Lewis in accepting his arguments for modal realism. It should also be pointed out that Lewis' arguments while often subtle can be followed with some effort and that he presents a very effective case.
This book consists of four chapters. The first chapter "A Philosophers' Paradise" lays the case for modal realism and argues that a plurality of worlds has utility in philosophy. Lewis begins by noting that he will restrict himself to possibilia and by writing off impossibilia. Lewis then goes on to explain how the usefulness of a plurality of worlds makes it likely for one to think that it is indeed true. Lewis considers the case of a possible worlds analysis of modality (showing how the "diamond" ("possibly") and "box" ("necessarily") symbols are mutually interdefinable and can be understood in terms of possible worlds). Lewis also considers the idea of "closeness" of possible worlds and defines such notions as counterfactuals and verisimilitude. Following this, Lewis considers content of possible worlds and considers analyses of thought, belief, and language. Lewis then shows how modal realism may be used to explain properties (universals and tropes), the fact that possible worlds are isolated and not spatio-temporally connected, and the fact of concreteness, plenitude, and actuality. Lewis maintains that actuality must be understood by making use of an indexical analysis. The second chapter "Paradox in Paradise?" shows some of the commonly made objections to modal realism and argues for why Lewis thinks they are inadequate. Lewis considers the objections made that according to his analysis "everything is actual", objections that try to trap modal realism in paradoxes akin to those of naïve set theory, an objection made that there are more worlds than there are (relying on a paradox in set theory), epistemic objections that we cannot know, objections made that the existence of possible worlds provides a road to skepticism or indifference (i.e. ethical paradoxes brought about by the existence of possible worlds), an objection made that modal realism causes the arbitrariness of this actual world to be lost, and finally "the incredulous stare" (the objection that modal realism flies in the face of common sense). Lewis provides good arguments against most of these objections, but ultimately the most powerful seem to be the objections from common sense. The third chapter "Paradise on the Cheap?" argues against the alternative to Lewis' view which attempts to make use of the utility of a plurality of worlds without committing oneself to modal realism (what Lewis calls "ersatz modal realism"). The "ersatzist program" replaces possible worlds with mere abstract representations. Lewis considers what he considers to be the three leading possibilities for ersatzism: linguistic ersatzism, pictorial ersatzism, and what he calls "magical" ersatzism. He finds each of these alternatives to be problematic and ultimately not be able to provide the benefits of possible worlds given the modal realist understanding. The fourth chapter is "Counterparts or Double Lives?". Here, Lewis considers the question of "counterparts" across worlds and attempts to resolve some of the apparent paradoxes which may ensue. He considers the cases of trans-world identity and overlap. Then, he provides an argument against the existence of trans-world individuals and an argument against what he terms "haecceitism". Finally, he provides an argument against constancy. From these arguments he concludes that his notion of counterparts is the correct analysis and is superior to the alternatives. Thus, stands the case for Lewis' modal realism.
Among analytic philosophers in the last century, David Lewis stands out as one of the most important. His arguments for modal realism in this book are fascinating and are important if one seeks to understand the issue of possible worlds. Ultimately even if one finds such objections as ethical paradoxes brought about by modal realism or the common sense objection convincing, Lewis' work still remains important in that it must be seriously considered. It should also be pointed out that while the idea of multiple worlds or universes appears to be playing some role in the more abstract reaches of theoretical physics (including the possibility that quantum mechanics may best be resolved by an appeal to multiple worlds) that these multiple worlds considered by physicists differ from the possible worlds of philosophers such as Lewis. To begin with there is the fact that the possible worlds considered by Lewis are spatiotemporally isolated. This does not appear to be the case with the multiple worlds considered by some physicists. Further, there may be reason to believe that the speculations of certain physicists regarding multiple universes are unwarranted scientifically (perhaps by an appeal to Occam's razor). Nevertheless, Lewis' analysis of possible worlds remains important and should be read by those interested in the further development of analytic philosophy.
| | On the Plurality of Worlds by Wiley-Blackwell A Monadology for the 20th century | David Lewis has quite a reputation that I have no interest in taking issue with, but I thought this book was just awful.
The basic idea is that, according to Lewis, any way that a world possibly could be, some world is. I admit the notion has a certain appeal--if you're concerned about why anything should exist at all. (If not "nothing" then at least "everything" gets you out of explaining why A but not B.)
Probably one should just stop right there, because this is a philosophical theory that, even if correct, is utterly useless. Lewis' other worlds don't interact with our world...at all. They are so ridiculously many and various, the distributions of their properties aren't correlated statistically with the properties of our world...at all.
I don't actually side with any of what Lewis calls his opposition, by the way, people who want, as he puts it, "Paradise on the cheap." On the contrary, I don't think any paradise can be had at any price, and most people who use the grammatical form of the counterfactual conditional (If it had been that A, then it would have been that B) don't really know what in hell they're saying. Probably what they mean is that the universe is a finite state Markov chain and that from some fixed initial point, most of the trajectories that go through A also go through B. Compare "if Michael Jordan had retired in 1989 then the Chicago Bulls would have won fewer than 6 NBA titles in the 1990s. (That this offhand analysis doesn't collapse to the material conditional when A is actual is almost certainly a point in its favor...the material conditional comes out true three-fourths of the time when the antecedent and consequent are completely unrelated...nobody intuits counterfactual conditionals as true when they come out materially true accidentally in some "nearby world"--counterfactual conditionals should be counterfactual supporting. That's just obvious, except to philosophers.)
Of course this won't handle cases like "If gravity were an inverse-cube relation then jelly sandwiches would taste groovier". If you're David Lewis, this is probably a perfectly good question to ask, or perhaps even analyze for seven pages, probably with a similarity metric and some kind of undergraduate cardinality argument. | | On the Plurality of Worlds by Wiley-Blackwell Most significant contribution to metaphysics in many years | | It's obvious to me that some of these reviewers don't understand either what Lewis was doing in this book or the standard philosophical response to it. He wasn't arguing that there are multiple universes connected to ours in some way explorable through science. Those would be parts of this world, in Lewis' sense. The worlds he's talking about are possible worlds. They aren't actual. That is, they don't exist in any way spatiotemporally or causally connected with the actual world. And yet he says they're as concrete as we are. Philosophers' responses to this view are incredibly interesting. They think the idea is nuts, and yet they have no way to resist the conclusion that he gives compelling arguments that his view solves numerous philosophical problems that no one has been able to deal with in a perfectly satisfactory way. This doesn't convince many people that his view is correct, but the response has been pretty strong among those who want to use his system without thinking that it's true. They call it a modal fiction, and the view is called fictionalism. This is becoming incredibly influential among metaphysicians. Aside from all that, most metaphysicians today recognize this book as just incredibly fruitful and creative in bringing together so many different strains in metaphysics. He deals with so many problems in such a lucid way that the book serves to introduce many problems in metaphysics, making advances in the discussion even apart from the contribution of his main thesis. | | On the Plurality of Worlds by Wiley-Blackwell Modal Realism -What's it all about (Alfie)? | | Crudely this book has been written to coordinate Cantor's transfinite number and set theory with philosophy. In English, this means that if space is infinite, then there are infinite worlds. This is rather like thinking of matter, and the creation of worlds, as outcomes of an infinite Las Vegas slot machine (my analogy-not his!) Some worlds will have someone called Hubert Humphrey who wins a US election, for example. But he will not be the same as the Hubert Humphrey who occupies this planet with us. (see chapter on Transworld Individuals, ie there
arent any people who exist in more than one world at a time, however similiar they are to other ones. This is a lot of fun, iof you enjoy strange ideas and understand words bigger than marmelade. I used the dictionary more times than I have since reading Spot the Dog and Janet and John Book 1. The book is studied as part of the foundation course in Philosophy at Harvard, according to some pages I read on the Internet. | | On the Plurality of Worlds by Wiley-Blackwell Philosophers Need to Learn More Physics | | My understanding is that this book is currently usually read out of idle curiosity and is not taken seriously because of being so at odds with common sense. Unfortunately for the general consensus about this book, the idea that infinitely many parallel universes actually exist now has enough backing in the world of Physics that it can no longer be viewed as utterly insane, however at odds it is with common sense. It is, in fact, becoming increasingly more likely that Philosophers and Philosophy students a few generations hence are going to wonder why Lewis wasn't seen as a visionary by his contemporaries. | | On the Plurality of Worlds by Wiley-Blackwell Product Description | | This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true. |
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