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Title: Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition
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Manufacturer: Belknap Press
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| Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition by Belknap Press Good for the younger reader, but not especially insightful | Although interesting and in some points insightful, the author of the book principally seems to miss the point of multidimensional strategy. Rather than thinking of strategy as an equation on a multidimensional graph, with defense and offense combining with strengths and weaknesses of opposing forced to produce the best operation, Luttwak seems to view modern strategy and tactics more in linear Napoleonic terms, calling this a paradox. Of course, there is no paradox in this logical endeavor, as the 'social' forces in strategy cannot be said to ever create a true paradox.
His understanding of why nations go to war is not particularly insightful (Machiavelli said the same thing five centuries ago) but is well written and intelligent to be an enjoyable read. It would prove very useful for the young reader attempting to discover what strategy is.
Luttwak's choice of military events to prove his theory is, of course, circumspect. But whose is not? Hart cherry-picked, as did Clauswitz and every other military strategist. He should not be faulted on this point, as it in no way detracts from the main issue of paradox.
The seeming lack of morality on conflict resolution demonstrates a lack of understanding of the necessities of fourth generational war, but does not demonstrate a lack of understanding of basic strategy or a lack of ethics. The subject of abstract strategy deserves ethics no more than the study of abstract math. Nevertheless, since the creation of the near real time war correspondent, it is impossible to consider war without considering public morality. The concentration camps of the British in the Boer War were effective. The complete and utter annihilation of Carthage also was effective. But both would now be untenable positions. Luttwik does not offer an answer for the European power at war about what to do to win a war. His lack of an answer for the paradox would by necessity eliminate the answer.
The book raises insightful questions and forces the reader the question his own assumptions about strategy, never a bad thing. Although ultimately a failure on the overriding theme, everything else to do with this book makes it enjoyable, and worth reading. | | Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition by Belknap Press Ignore the Detractors, This Book is Brilliant | Edit of 21 Dec 07 to add links.
My own discovery of how the threat changes depending on the levels of analysis would not have occurred without this brilliant book by Edward Luttwak. It was his careful and reasoned discussion of how specific capabilities and policies might not make sense at one level of analysis, but do when combined with others, that helped me understand why US (and other) intelligence communities continue to get so much wrong.
First to credit Luttwak: anti-tank weapons make no sense in isolation (tactical level), but if they slow the tank down enough to allow artillery and close air support to have an impact (operational level), they might close gaps and win victories (strategic level). Bottom line: nothing in war can be considered in isolation (including, one might add, the post-war needs that enable an exit strategy).
It was from Luttwak's work that the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today the Marine Corps Intelligence Command) developed the new model for analysis that distinguished between the four levels of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical), combined that with the three major domains (military, geographic, and civil), and then cross-walked that against every single mission area (infantry, artillery, tanks, aviation, etcetera).
One simple example of the importance of Luttwak's work to intelligence: at the time (1990) the Libyan T-72 tank was considered by the US Intelligence Community to be a very high threat because it was the best tank that money could then buy--but on reflection, we found this was true only at the technical level of optimal lethality. At the tactical level the tank was being stored in the open, poorly maintained by poorly trained crews, parts cannibalization occurring regularly, this dropped the threat to low. At the operational level there were a significant number of the tanks scattered around and available, this raised it to a medium threat at that level. At the strategic level, the tanks could not be sustained in battle for more than two weeks, and dropped again to low.
Edward Luttwak, in company with Colin Gray, Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters, and Steve Metz, is one of the most brilliant and clear-spoken of the strategists writing in English, and this book will remain--for years to come--a fundamental building block in the learning and maturation of national security strategy.
Other recommended books at this level:
Modern Strategy
Transformation of War
The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq
Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts That Will Shape the 21st Century
Security Studies for the 21st Century
Strategy: Process, Content, Context--An International Perspective
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
The Sword and The Pen - Selections From The World's Greatest Military Writings
War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires
| | Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition by Belknap Press What on Earth is he thinking?!? | | Utter hogwash. War is violence with a purpose not a physical phenomenon that burns itself out like a forest fire. The function of every war is not to bring peace but to acheive specific political objectives (cf. Clausewitz). If you intervene in a war, you are not interrupting some chemical reaction. You are acting politically to alter the course of the conflict: perhaps saving lives, perhaps not; perhaps helping to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict, perhaps not. I'd like to see how "logical" Luttwak would be if it was his family and town that was being subjected to sustained genocidal attack. The clue to all this is his view that "other peoples' wars" should be allowed to run their course. You cannot but conclude that "other people" are not quite like him... | | Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition by Belknap Press Self-Fulfilling Prophecy | This is a sprawling, but very important and perceptive analysis. Luttwak's often revised book has several messages. The most topically interesting one was apparently missed by the reviewers, who concentrated on the paradoxical nature of strategic relations.
Luttwak notes that modern industrial societies will not tolerate casualties in war, and that therefore battlefield strategies must focus on winning wars without direct contact with the enemy and without risk of lives. He claims that while the strategic bombing of WW II was a failure, strategic bombing as practised in Iraq in 1991 and in Kossovo was a success. According to Luttwak, the difference is more accurate intelligence and more accurate bombing - not necessarily cruise-missiles.He points out that with a smaller expenditure of bombs in 1 month in 1991 than the allies had expended in Germany in 1945, the coalition succeeding in totally disrupting Iraq communications and industry. The outlines of how the next war ought to be fought, and in fact was fought, were clear from Luttwak's presentation. One almost gets the feeling that the war was fought to prove his theory, and it is very likely that changes in US defense policy are being based on lessons drawn from the success of the war, in the light of Luttwak's recommendations. Luttwak does not take into account that not all enemies are equal. The strategy that worked so well for Iraq might not work for a more organized and determined foe such as North Korea. | | Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition by Belknap Press Paradox is only part of the story. | | Historians and political scientists have coined many theories to contain and explain warfare. Systems theorists like Robert Jervis attempt to study conflict from the point of view of complex hierarchies and nonlinear feedbacks: a nation cannot always attain its goals because of how its neighbors and opponents will react. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the linear logic of cognitive approaches to war: individuals have certain intentions and we can explain their actions according to their understanding of the world. Luttwak's book is between these two: according to the paradoxical approach, individuals may seek certain objectives, but the consequences of their actions don't always follow as expected. This approach finds its expression more recently in Zeev Moaz's Paradoxes of War. The strength of the paradoxical approach is that it deals with units that strategists can understand and manipulate: individuals and nations. Systems approaches are valuable for their historical perspective, but one cannot easily understand or manipulate the international power structure on a daily basis. Paradoxical approaches also help in isolating the perversity of strategy: every action implies some equal but unknowable reaction. Radar invites chaff. Maneuver warfare invites a defense in depth, or counterattacks. Overall superiority invites assymetrical counterstrategies. The major weakness of the paradoxical approach is that intentions and consequences conflict only some of the time. We might explain the failure of the Maginot Line by paradoxical theories, but how do we explain an attack or a defense that was successful? That said, Luttwak's work is important for two reasons: first, it highlights the necessity of trying to anticipate how your neighbors and opponents will react to new techniques, tactics, operations, etc. Second, it is overall one of the best general introductions to the different levels of warfare: technical, tactical, operational, strategic, and diplomatic. Other texts, such as Leonhard's Art of Maneuver deal with particular levels, without any attempt at synthesis. Students of warfare will find the paradoxical approach helpful at times, and useless at others. If we accept that sometimes intentions don't match consequences, we can dramatically improve the prospects for success. Unfortunately, this approach is not the panacea that Luttwak hopes it can be. | | Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition by Belknap Press Product Description | If you want peace, prepare for war. A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive. The worst road may be the best route to battle. Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows--they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict. In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of "post-heroic" war in Kosovo in 1999--an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed. In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world's foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace. |
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